1	this	settlement	makes	public	policy	sense.
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2	As we see it, the settlement has
3	three principal components. First, the UNE rate
4	decision ensures that competition largely
5	relying on the UNE platform but also grounded in
6	UNE loops is stabilized and prepped for growth
7	for at least the next two years. This was
8	critical. Staff in its supporting testimony
9	stresses that it could not have entered into the
10	settlement without a reasoned confidence that
11	the new UNE rates would permit effective retail
12	competition in all local markets. To generate
13	that confidence, staff performed not a cost
14	analysis that was done in the rate case
15	but a margin analysis. From that analysis it
16	concluded that retail price competition based on
17	UNEs could act as an effective alternative to
18	retail rate regulation.
19	We think staff is correct. AT&T,
20	for one, believes that with the UNE rate
21	decision and the settlement, it can compete
22	aggressively across the broad spectrum of the
23	local market. It would be inappropriate to
24	signal our competitive plans here, but I can say
25	that we intend to be a force in the New York

1	market for some time to come, to compete in the
2	short term and to invest for the long.
3	The second major component of the
4	settlement is the grant of increased retail rate
5	flexibility to Verizon. This is, in some sense,
6	none of our business. However, from an
7	analytical perspective, the trade-off is exactly
8	correct. The transition from monopoly to
9	competitive conditions should always include a
LO	transition from regulated pricing to market-
11	driven pricing. We believe the current
12	conditions will support price competition, and
13	thus we think the timing of this decision,
14	including both the pricing freedom and the
15	residual controls that staff proposes, is
16	correct; and here staff also balances its pro-
17	competitive vision with fairness to Verizon. If
18	Verizon is to be forced to accept conditions
19	that will subject it to genuine competition, it
20	should also get the benefits of being a
21	competitor in a competitive market. Thus, the
22	settlement is not neutral, but it is fair.
23	Finally, the third major piece of
24	the puzzle is the requirement that Verizon
25	participate in the workshops as the settlement

1	begins to enhance facilities-based competition.
2	The inclusion of these workshops
3	in the settlement agreement is critically
4	important. We can have no illusions here. As
5	accomplished and sophisticated as we have become
6	in managing UNE-P transactions, that is how
7	primitive we are in managing facilities-based
8	competition that relies on the UNE loop.
9	Verizon itself confirmed this when it insisted
10	that its processes for performing hot cuts cost
11	it nearly \$200 each. What this means is simply
12	that Verizon doesn't have a commercially viable
13	procedure for performing hot cuts.
14	The settlement includes Verizon's
15	agreement to charge \$35 per hot cut for the next
16	two years, notwithstanding the claimed cost of
17	185. But this is a Band-Aid, not a solution.
18	We don't think Verizon's actual costs for
19	performing hot cuts are anywhere near \$185, but
20	we do think that their processes are slow,
21	unduly labor-intensive and, as an inevitable
22	result, not commercially viable in mass market
23	quantities.
24	Verizon has insisted throughout
25	this proceeding that the ultimate chiective of

2	"facilities-based competition" by which it
3	presumably means competition based on the UNE
4	loop. We have a little of that kind of
5	competition, but very little. Verizon projects
6	that it will perform perhaps 150,000 hot cuts in
7	a year. By comparison, in the UNE-P market, a
8	single firm can place that many orders in a
9	month. If we are to evolve to a market where
10	UNE loop competition is as effective and
11	ubiquitous as UNE-P competition, we will need
12	hot cut processes for converting customers from
13	one carrier to another that are as efficient and
14	as cost-effective as the processes that we have
15	for converting customers using UNE-P.
16	We believe that UNE-L competition
17	should be thought of not as a replacement for
18	UNE-P competition but rather as an alternative.
19	Resale competition has a permanent role to play
20	in the local market, just as it does in the long
21	distance market. It is worth noting in this
22	regard that the largest long distance carrier in
23	New York State is an upstart reseller called
24	Verizon Long Distance, and they would be the
25	first to tell you how much the public benefits

this Commission is to promote what it calls

1	from their presence in that market. Similarly,
2	local competition based on UNE-P should be
3	viewed as a valuable permanent part of the local
4	competitive landscape. That does not mean that
5	we should not also promote facilities-based
6	competition based on UNE-L.
7	Verizon has often argued that the

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Verizon has often argued that the way to promote UNE-L competition is by discouraging UNE-P competition. This is exactly backwards. Instead of making UNE-P competition less attractive and less cost-effective, the objective must be to make UNE-L competition more attractive and more cost-effective. AT&T is investing heavily in switches in New York. Our investment will not be deterred by having an attractive UNE-P platform on which to build. It will be deterred by the threat that UNE-L transactions cannot be accomplished in an efficient and cost-effective way.

The settlement's workshops offer a process for moving towards that goal and the most important but far from the only step we will need to take in this proceeding is a fundamental review and revision of the hot cut process. AT&T believes this will involve two

the most efficient processing we can design for
performing hot cuts given the network now in
place. The second will look farther down the
road at how we can redesign the network so that
it performs hot cuts as seamlessly and
efficiently as it performs UNE-P transactions
or, for that matter, as seamlessly as it
performs long distance PIC changes.

There are other important steps contemplated by this settlement and they too are necessary if we are to have facilities-based competition. We need a method for offsetting the enormous historic advantage Verizon has over its competitors with respect to the building access. We also need to stop Verizon's persistent discrimination in the provisioning of T1 circuits. The settlement proposes that all of these issues be addressed as well.

I don't want to suggest that the settlement is perfect. It is not. Its greatest shortcoming is it is term. Two years is too short. We will not finish the work we need to undertake to make facilities-based competition as efficient as UNE-P competition in that time,

1	which means our next review of how Verizon
2	should be regulated and what competitive
3	conditions should be maintained in the market
4	will be premature.

There are also a number of other critical matters of concern that are simply left out of the settlement: DSL provisioning and a comprehensive review of collocation arrangements and costs are the most obvious, although the latter might be well be built into the workshops. Still nothing in the settlement constrains the Commission from conducting other proceedings and issuing other rules as needs be to promote competition.

In sum, the settlement has three components: A set of rules and rates that makes UNE-P effective on a mass market basis and UNE-L effective on a selective basis; rate flexibility for Verizon consistent with the competition that UNE-P brings; and a series of workshops to bring UNE-L and other facilities-based forms of competition up to the same standards of performance that UNE-P already has achieved. That is a coherent pro-competitive and pro-consumer settlement agreement, and we support it

1		fu	ıl	ly

2	Like Sisyphus, we have been
3	pushing a large rock up a steep hill; but unlike
4	that poor bedeviled man, we have reached a
5	plateau where we can rest briefly, rekindle our
6	strength and review our progress. There is an
7	equally steep hill to climb before we reach the
8	pinnacle where local competition is as firmly
9	entrenched as long distance competition is
10	today, but we need not go back to the bottom.
11	Having come this far, we should be able to
12	complete the rest of the climb.
13	Finally, Madam Chairman, a
14	personal note. There is a segment of American
15	society that views government, and by
16	implication those who work in it, with suspicion
17	if not outright hostility, as a foreign or at
18	best parasitic body in our culture. I beg very
19	much to differ. Government is merely ourselves
20	doing collectively that which we cannot do
21	individually and which market forces will not do
22	for us. Government mostly comes to the public's
23	attention when it has failed. As a result, its
24	successes and hence its value is seldom fully
25	appreciated.

1	This settlement happened only
2	because of the extraordinary work of the
3	Commission's staff and judges. My experience
4	here and throughout the past six years reminds
5	me that the term "civil servant" is and ought to
6	be a term of distinction. It is a privilege to
7	work here. With this rate decision and this
8	settlement, New York has proven that in capable
9	hands the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is a
LO	viable and valuable piece of legislation.
11	Paraphrasing the words of Mark Twain, rumors of
12	the demise of the Act are greatly exaggerated
L3	and, as a result, local telephone competition is
l 4	alive and well and living in New York.
L5	Thank you.
16	MS. HELMER: I do have one
17	question, Mr. Davidow. I have several but I'll
18	leave some of them until later. The Commission
19	obviously is going to be very concerned in
20	analyzing this settlement as to what the state
21	of competition will be, what the prospects for
22	competition will be, as it's interested in
23	everything about the small providers and large
24	providers and, as one of the representatives of
25	what I would describe as the large providers of

1	competition, I appreciate the fact that you may
2	not want to describe in detail business plans
3	that your company may have for the future of New
4	York, but is there anything more that you can
5	offer to the Commission besides "trust me" in
6	terms of what AT&T sees for the landscape in New
7	York State?
8	MR. DAVIDOW: Well, in terms of I
9	start out with my background as an anti-trust
LO	lawyer and a recognition that AT&T is the second
11	largest local exchange carrier in the state and
L2	with lines, and the largest direct competitor of
L3	Verizon, and if I were to make announcements of
L 4	future pricing plans, my friend would probably
15	subpoena me.
L 6	MS. HELMER: No, but would you be
L7	willing to provide some more detail in private
L8	discussions with Commission staff or
19	Commissioners?
20	MR. DAVIDOW: We would be pleased
21	to do so, yes.
22	MS. HELMER: O.K. Thank you.
23	MS. LEE: Thank you, Mr.
24	Davidow.
25	Our next closing statement will

1	be Mr. Groves from WorldCom.
2	MR. GROVES: Thank you, Madam
3	Chairman and Judge Lee, and good morning. Still
4	morning, isn't it? I'm Curtis Groves, Senior
5	Attorney for WorldCom.
6	Thank you for the opportunity to
7	express today in this public forum WorldCom's
8	support for the Joint Proposal to create a new
9	regulatory plan for Verizon.
10	As the department staff's
11	testimony correctly explains, this Commission
12	has been a pro-competitive leader for many
13	years. It is the standard by which other
14	regulatory agencies are often judged, and you
15	should continue to be proud of that. This is
16	the first Commission to open its local markets
17	to competition, and the Commission's work has
18	not stopped there.
19	With the UNE rate decision that
20	the Commission adopted last month, the
21	Commission took another important step toward
22	ensuring the viability of local competition in
23	New York. Today WorldCom joins a number of
24	parties in asking the Commission to take a
25	second such step by approval of the Joint

Proposal and, at the onset, I want to join my
colleagues in offering on behalf of WorldCom my
praise for the extraordinary efforts of the
Department of Public Service staff and the three
Administrative Law Judges in negotiating this
plan which brought together such a wide range of
issues and competing interests.

Though Verizon's Incentive Plan is primarily a plan to regulate Verizon's retail operations, the premise underlying the proposed plan is that, as a result of this commission's pro-competitive policies, the competitive market forces will begin to dictate retail pricing decisions and that the Commission's role as regulator of retail services can be lessened. Of course, the Commission would retain all its regulatory authority, but whereas government regulation has for so long been a surrogate for competition, the plan envisions a day where competition is strong enough so that the commission's regulatory oversight of retail rates is no longer needed in such strong force.

For competition to flourish in the manner that the plan envisions, certain new pro-competitive initiatives are needed, and this

7	Joint	Droposal	recomizes	that	fact
1	JOINT	LLODOR	recognizes	tnat	IACT.

As we mentioned in our written statement, in support of the Joint Proposal, we believe the proposed plan could have been stronger in some respects, but we expect that proceedings before this Commission and before the Federal Communications Commission will address those issues, including the development and to approve the variety of service that Verizon provides its customers. Overall, the UNE rate decision, hence this proposed plan, will permit WorldCom's MCI Group the opportunity to market its local service offering to New York consumers statewide which, under previous regulatory conditions in New York, we were unable to do.

And just as the Commission's work did not stop with the 271 process, its work will continue after this plan is approved through the task forces created by the plan and through other Commission proceedings. We look forward to being a competitor in the New York market for a long time to come, and we look forward to continuing to work with the Commission's able staff to do our part to make sure that the

1	competitive marketplace envisioned by the plan
2	comes to fruition.
3	That's all I have to say.
4	MS. LEE: Thank you.
5	MS. HELMER: And let me just
6	follow up with the same question. Would you be
7	willing to provide more detail about your future
8	plans for competition in the state privately to
9	Commission staff or to Commissioners?
10	MR. GROVES: Madam Chairman, we'd
11	be very pleased to do so.
12	MS. HELMER: Thank you.
13	MS. LEE: Thank you.
14	The next closing statement is Mr.
15	FitzGerald on behalf of Focal.
16	MR. FITZGERALD: Good afternoon,
17	Chairman Helmer, your Honor. My name is Brian
18	FitzGerald. I'm a partner with the law firm of
19	LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, and I'm
20	appearing here today on behalf of three
21	parties: Allegiance Telecom of New York, Inc.,
22	Focal Communications Corporation of New York and
23	Time Warner Communications of New York, L.P.
24	Allegiance, Focal and Time Warner are primarily
25	facilities-based commetitive telecommunications

1	service providers.
2	Before I discuss the plan, I'd
3	like to join the other parties with a heartfelt
4	thank you to the Department of Public Service
5	staff and to Law Judges Eleanor Stein and Jaclyn
6	Brilling for their hard work and dedication in
7	facilitating the arduous negotiations that
8	underlie the Joint Proposal in this case. I
9	think that their efforts collectively made this
10	Joint Proposal a reality.
11	While my clients each executed
12	the Joint Proposal and support its adoption by
13	the Commission in the proceeding, their support
14	must be viewed in context. The Joint Proposal
15	is a negotiated outcome. It does not represent
16	an ideal result. Rather the Joint Proposal
17	represents significant compromises by many
18	parties with widely divergent interests. It
19	nonetheless appears fair, adequate and to be in
20	the public interest.
21	Having said that, certain aspects
22	of the Joint Proposal are very important to
23	Allegiance, Focal and Time Warner, and I'd like
24	to briefly highlight them for you.

These issues are hot cut rates,

1	the treatment of reciprocal compensation and the
2	continued commitment on the part of the
3	Commission and Verizon to policies that favor
4	facilities-based competition.
5	Regarding hot cut rates, the
6	Joint Proposal would reduce the cost to switch
7	customers from Verizon's switch to a CLEC's
8	switch from what we believe to be unjustified
9	\$185 rate down to a more manageable \$35 rate.
10	As staff correctly recognizes in its testimony,
11	the \$185 rate would have "at best stalled CLEC
12	entry, and at worse reversed it." We believe
13	that staff's testimony understates the severe
14	harm that a \$185 non-recurring hot cut rate
15	would cause facilities-based competitive
16	providers of local telephone service.
17	Fortunately, under the Joint Proposal no
18	competitor provider will ever pay the \$185
19	rate.
20	Allegiance, Focal and Time Warner
21	fully support Staff's recommendation that the
22	process and cost of performing hot cuts be
23	comprehensively analyzed prior to the expiration
24	of the Joint Proposal. In fact, they look

forward to actively participating in the hot cut

1	evaluation process.
2	Turning now to my second issue of
3	reciprocal compensation, the possibility that
4	Verizon would seek retroactive payment or
5	reciprocal compensation from competitive local
6	exchange carriers is eliminated by the Joint
7	Proposal. This aspect of the Joint Proposal is
8	essential because the possibility of CLECs
9	having to refund money to Verizon based on
10	Verizon's own misstatements regarding switching
11	costs is certainly not palatable. This approach
12	also has the advantage of maintaining stability
13	in the industry.
14	Regarding facilities-based
15	competition and as a representative of
16	facilities-based providers, while this
17	Commission has consistently been a leader in
18	promoting telecommunications competition,
19	Allegiance, Focal and Time Warner believe that
20	the Joint Proposal places much focus on the
21	needs of to of carriers utilizing the Unbundled
22	Network Element Platform the UNE-P to
23	serve customers. UNE-P strategies, by

definition, rely solely on Verizon's net- work.

Accordingly, if this Commission is to meet its

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1	long held goal of encouraging the development of
2	a fully redundant statewide communications
3	network, it must continue to be vigilant in its
4	commitment to facilities-based competition. At
5	a minimum, ensuring the proper functioning of
6	the Competitive Enhancement Task Forces, which
7	were negotiated as part of the Joint Proposal,
8	represented an important step in that
9	direction. The Competitive Enhancement Task
10	Force was intended by the parties to address
11	various long standing hurdoes such as billing
L 2	and collection, building access and efficient
13	provisioning of standard or combined extended
L 4	loops or EELs.
15	True facilities-based competition
16	will only flourish in New York State if these
L7	issues, along with interconnection and other
18	bottleneck issues are resolved. We will
19	actively support the staff's and the parties'
20	working on the Competitive Enhancement Task
21	Force and look forward to them resolving these
22	difficult issues.
23	In conclusion, Allegiance, Focal
24	and Time Warner support the Joint Proposal as an
) E	togettable regetiated outcome and were that it

1	be adopted by the Commission.
2	Thank you for the opportunity to
3	present these comments.
4	MS. LEE: Thank you, Mr. Fitz-
5	Gerald.
6	The next statement will be from
7	Mr. Davis, I guess? Mr. Davis.
8	MR. DAVIS: Don Davis on behalf
9	of Z-Tel.
10	I'd like to start by thanking the
11	Judges Stein and Brilling and the staff for
12	bringing us to this point right here. I visited
13	here and twice went back to Tampa and explained
14	to my officers that the chance for a settlement
15	and the work looked bleak at best, and I did not
16	think a settlement was possible.
17	I'm happy to say as a
18	prognosticator, I was incorrect. It's only been
19	through the effort of staff and judges that
20	we're able to sit here at this table today in
21	which we as a company are a principal.
22	Z-Tel supports the settlement.
23	Do we like everything that's in it? No. In an
24	ideal world, would we suggest changes to it?
25	Yes Can we accept it as it is? Yes The

•	primary eming, and re a ment describerly that we
2	filed, we think this brings to the CLECs
3	community certainty. It brings certainty around
4	rights. It brings certainty around viability.
5	It brings certainty around performance standards
6	and from the CLECs perspective, uncertainty is a
7	killer. You can't raise money in an uncertain
8	environment and you can't make plans in an
9	uncertain environment, but what this settlement
10	gives us is some closure. It allows us to stop
11	what at least we at Z-Tel believe as a CLEC, to
12	stop erosion of a customer base and affords us
13	an opportunity. It provides a floor from which
14	we can review it and, for that reason, we
15	believe the settlement is in our interests as
16	well as in the public interests.
17	The two years, which is the life
18	of this plan, is an eternity in the life of a
19	CLEC. CLECs are what are we going to do next?
20	Three months is long-term planning. So the two
21	two years that we get here is important to
22	us in terms of building the skill and scope
23	that's going to be necessary to be the
24	competitive force and the controller of Verizon
25	in terms of monopolistic actions that the

1	Commission is looking for here, and we think
2	that's an acceptable period for that to take
3	place and to reach that necessary skill scale
4	and scope.

Relative to that, there are a couple of things that we would ask the Commission in approving this agreement to do on the public record and to say. The first one is very simple, in that do we see the items at this time as critical for us on a short-term basis, and we would ask the Commission to set a schedule line as to resolution to look forward to, and we would suggest that to be 30 days. We believe that if we were able to accomplish what's been accomplished in the last 250 days relative to an overall settlement, we should be able to settle that refund issue within a 30-day period.

Secondly, we would ask from a broader perspective, ask the Commission to tell us what they anticipate happening at the end of the two-year period. We would like for the Commission to publicly say that two years is a long time and at the end of two years, there will need to be an evaluation of what's taken

place in the market. There will need to be an

2	evaluation as to the state of competition, that
3	certain aspects of this plan are not going to
4	automatically sunset or go away, but the
5	Commission having taken the opportunity, to
6	allow the record to be built as to what the next
7	step of the competition ought to be in the state
8	of New York; and for the settlement itself, we
9	are supportive and we appreciate the opportunity
10	to step forward and say that.
11	MS. LEE: Thank you. The next
12	presentation Mr. Roland, from BridgeCom.
13	MR. ROLAND: Chairman Helmer and
14	Judge Lee: On behalf of BridgeCom International
15	we thank you for convening this proceeding and
16	giving us the opportunity to resolve these

issues.

BridgeCom joins in with every other participant in this proceeding in expressing deep thanks to Commission staff, to the Administrative Law Judges for their work on this, Judge Brilling particularly with respect to BridgeCom. They and staff were willing to listen to the concerns of smaller carriers, not just the large ones, the huge dominant ones who

participated in the proceedings, but also the
smaller ones and many of the concerns, those
particularly of BridgeCom, were taken into
account, and the courtesy of the patience was
extraordinary, and for that BridgeCom is
extremely grateful.

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A principal concern of BridgeCom in connection with the next two years, of course, is the well-being of the community and, as we heard today or as I heard today, there seems to be a difference of opinion between Commission staff and the company as to the extent of the availability of business UNE-P outside the servicing offices in New York City. The staff view is the view that BridgeCom has: In the prefiling statement there was no limitation in the number of business POTS lines that would be served through UNE-P outside those 17 central offices, and that the FCC's threeline limit in certain central offices in the top 15 SMSAs was not applicable because, as staff indicated in the prefiling statement, it was a one-way ratchet and competitors were entitled to the more liberal standard either of the prefiling statement or of the FCC rules.

I heard the company say today
that nothing in this plan was intended to in any
way limit the availability of UNE-P under the
prefiling statement, that the only activity was
to increase the number; so, as we understand it,
there would be no limitation on business lines
outside those 17 in New York City, or 30 New
York City central offices, and within those
central offices the number was increased from
three up to the 18, and we ask the Commission to
confirm that in its order should it approve the
joint settlement agreement.

And then finally, we'd also note that under some readings of the prefiling statement at the end of the transition period there could have been an entitlement to certain rate increases, the beginning of the transition rates from UNE-P rates up to wholesale discount rates. The company today has said there will be no rate increases for UNE-P during the terms of the plan, so that, as we understand it, any conditions in the prefiled statement as to the availability of UNE-P, which someone might interpret as depending upon the beginning of the transition rates, would not be applicable to the

1	two-year term of this plan. We would also ask
2	the Commission to confirm that.
3	All that having been said,
4	BridgeCom endorses the settlement and asks the
5	Commission to approve it.
6	MS. LEE: Thank you. Before
7	turning to closing statements from Verizon and
8	staff, is there anyone else, any other parties
9	or members of the public, who would care to make
10	a statement at this time?
11	Sir? Could you come up and speak
12	into the microphone, please.
13	MR. THORNTON: My name is Lynn
14	Thornton. I'm on the staff of the New York
15	State Assembly. Assemblyman Richard Brodsky
16	asked me to come and reiterate what he said in a
17	letter to Judge Lee that was sent out last
18	week.
19	He is concerned with the haste in
20	which this Joint Proposal is going to decision.
21	He's not certain that the public has had an
22	opportunity to review, obviously, facts in the
23	public domain, and he's concerned with issues
24	such as no mention of anything like the former

infusion fund and cutback on Verizon's service

1	quality factors and the flexibility, the rate
2	flexibility, provisions of the settlement for
3	Verizon over the next two years and this is, as
4	you know, set forth in his letter from last
5	week. He asked me to come and underline this
6	and stress this during this hearing.
7	MS. LEE: Thank you.
8	Is there anyone else who would
9	care to make a statement at this time?
10	Hearing none, shall we turn to
11	Verizon and then staff.
L2	MS. THORN: Good afternoon, Madam
L3	Chairman. My name is Sandra Dilorio Thorn, and
L 4	I speak today on behalf of Verizon New York
L5	Inc.
L 6	First let me echo my praise for
L7	the hard work and dedication that Judges Stein
L 8	and Brilling have shown to this process without
L9	which this settlement would not have been
20	accomplished. I thank them sincerely.
21	The Joint Proposal before the
22	Commission today that seeks approval of
23	Verizon's Incentive Plan is the product of long
24	and careful negotiations among Verizon, Staff,
25	representatives of the public interest and the

1	New York communications industry. The result of
2	that careful balancing process, as the record
3	demonstrates, is a plan that first and foremost
4	serves the public interest. The Joint Proposal
5	will do this by stimulating competition,
6	investment and innovation, while requiring
7	Verizon to maintain high quality service in the
8	New York local telecom market.
9	At the same time, the Joint
10	Proposal will allow Verizon to respond to the
11	competition that this Commission's pro-
12	competitive policies have already produced,
13	competition that will be heightened as a result
14	of the recent Commission decision in the UNE
15	case. In short, the Joint Proposal is a
16	careful, balanced step in the right direction
17	which is fully consistent with this Commission's
18	long standing policy of creating a
19	telecommunications market that is disciplined by
20	competitive forces and eliminating the
21	artificial constraints of regulation when they
22	are no longer necessary or productive.
23	The Plan, as you know, has three
24	central components: Pricing flexibility,
25	service quality commitments, and a transition to

1	GAAP accounting. In addition, as part of the
2	Joint Proposal, Verizon has agreed to several
3	items that can benefit chief competitors,
4	including the commitment to reduce the approved
5	price of hot cuts, to make UNE-P widely
6	available by expanding its availability to the
7	small business market, to implement a special
8	services process improvement program and to
9	participate in industry task forces designed to
10	enhance competition even further. In this
11	context, the competitive and regulatory
12	flexibility that the Plan creates for Verizon
13	New York is undeniably appropriate and indeed
14	necessary. Adopting the Joint Proposal is the
15	next appropriate step in the Commission's
16	efforts to transition New York from a regulated
17	telecommunications market to a fully competitive
18	one.
19	Let's first turn to the pricing
20	flexibility components of the Joint Proposal.
21	In the context of the increasingly competitive
22	telecommunications market in which Verizon is
23	operating and will operate in the future,
24	providing Verizon with the flexibility to adjust
25	prices as the market dictates simply makes

1	sense. Where competition exists, the Commission
2	has no need to attempt to discipline the prices
3	of any player through artificial regulatory
4	constraints. Market forces are a far more
5	effective and direct means of achieving that
6	result and meeting those ends. The Joint
7	Proposal, by removing unnecessary regulatory
8	constraints, will allow Verizon to compete more
9	effectively and will protect Verizon's
LO	incentives to continue to be an aggressive
11	competitor. Pricing flexibility will also allow
L2	Verizon to determine how best to recover its
L3	costs and that will lead to an increased
L 4	interest by Verizon in expanding investment in
L 5	technology and ability in this state.
16	Finally, as Staff has noted in
L7	its testimony, providing Verizon with pricing
L8	flexibility is important because, if Verizon
L 9	adjusts its prices to a level more consistent
20	with cost, it will provide more correct price
21	signals to the market, which is critical if the
22	competitive market is to operate properly.
23	While some might suggest that any
24	plan that permits Verizon to potentially raise
25	rates is inherently for consumers and cannot

1	serve the public interest, this is not the
2	case. It is important to remember that, while
3	pricing flexibility may allow Verizon the
4	freedom to raise prices to some degree, the
5	public interest is well protected by this Joint
6	Proposal and the conmpetitive marketplace.
7	The Plan limits the degree to

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which Verizon can raise prices and has special protections in place for both rural and Lifeline customers. Their interests are entirely protected; but aside from this, the marketplace itself can be trusted to exert the appropriate discipline. As Staff has recognized, the Commission's order of January 28th in the UNE decision has provided competitors with a wide margin to cover their costs and to earn a profit, while allowing them to provide competitively priced services. In this market, Verizon will undertake any price increase at its own risk, and the competitors that can readily undercut Verizon prices will be ready and waiting to attract any customers who choose not to pay Verizon's prices. Verizon will have to increase its value proposition to its customers through a judicious use of the pricing